Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 42
Number 4 Symposium: Unethical Says Who?: A
Look at How People and Institutions Help
Businesses Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations

pp.1129-1168

Symposium: Unethical Says Who?: A Look at How People and Institutions
Help Businesses Fulfill Their Ethical Obligations

Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate
"Conscience"
Colin P. Marks

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Colin P. Marks, Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate "Conscience", 42 Val. U. L.
Rev. 1129 (2008).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/3

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information,
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

Marks: Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate "

JIMINY CRICKET FOR THE CORPORATION:
UNDERSTANDING THE CORPORATE
“CONSCIENCE”
Colin P. Marks*
I. INTRODUCTION
In Disney’s classic retelling of the fable Pinocchio, soon after being
granted life by the Blue Fairy, Geppetto’s wooden boy is assigned a
conscience in the form of the talking insect, Jiminy Cricket.1 The
implication of this assignment is clear; as Pinocchio is not yet a real boy,
he does not possess a conscience and must rely on an external voice,
such as Jiminy Cricket, to tell him what is right from wrong.
Throughout the movie, Pinocchio gets into a number of misadventures
including some debacles resulting from ignoring his assigned conscience
(including one in which he is half-transformed into an ass).2
In this sense, Pinocchio makes an appropriate analogy for the
modern American for-profit corporation.
Like Pinocchio, the
corporation is an artificial entity created by humans. It is then given
“life,” so to speak, by the states and interacts with the individuals and
society around it. And like Pinocchio, corporations have often found
themselves embroiled in misadventures, seemingly from acting without
a conscience. Other commentators have characterized corporations as
soulless,3 analogizing them to the tin man of the Wizard of Oz4 (who has
no heart) or the Jewish Golem, which can only mindlessly carry-out the
instructions slipped into its mouth on a piece of paper.5 But are
corporations truly without any sort of conscience or do they also have a
Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law; J.D., University of
Houston Law Center; B.S. University of Missouri—Columbia. Prior to accepting a position
at St. Mary’s University, Professor Marks was an associate in the trial department of Baker
Botts, L.L.P., Houston, Texas, where he concentrated in areas of commercial law and
attorney-client privilege. The author would like to acknowledge the hard work and
assistance of his research assistants—Myles Bentsen, Jason Goss, and David Gregorcyk—in
writing this Article, as well as to thank Professor Reynaldo Valencia of St. Mary’s
University School of Law for his support and feedback. The author would also like to
thank his wife Jill, daughter Savannah, and son George for their love and support.
1
See generally PINOCCHIO (Walt Disney Pictures 1940).
2
See id.
3
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 134 (3d ed. 2005).
4
Lawrence E. Mitchell & Theresa A. Gabaldon, If I Only Had a Heart: Or, How Can We
Identify a Corporate Morality, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1645, 1646-47 (2002).
5
LAWRENCE E. MITCHELL, CORPORATE IRRESPONSIBILITY: AMERICA’S NEWEST EXPORT 44
(2001); RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTTOM LINE: WHY CORPORATIONS MAKE GOOD
PEOPLE DO BAD THINGS 21 (1996).
*
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“Jiminy Cricket”–an external voice that influences them to act in a way
that could be deemed “right” or “good?” The question is a difficult one,
in part because defining what is “right” is such a subjective task.
However, if we view corporate behavior more broadly, to turn the
question to what causes corporations to engage in conduct that benefits
society, we understand that some external force or forces must direct the
corporation. This Article seeks to analyze the external forces that curb or
drive corporate behavior as they relate to activities that benefit society in
the context of having a “conscience.”
Part II of this Article examines the corporation from a historical
perspective, tracking its evolution from a small number of specially
chartered organizations with a limited, publicly oriented purpose, to the
modern, highly regulated profit-making organizations of today. Part III
examines whether the modern corporation can have a conscience and
what that term means with regard to such an artificial entity. Part IV
identifies three driving forces behind what will be termed corporate
behavior that is beneficial to society: behavior driven by legal
compliance; behavior that also benefits the corporation; and, behavior
that is seemingly driven by altruistic (or semi-altruistic) motives. Part V
reflects upon how these categories can be used to evaluate corporate
behavior.
II. EVOLVING PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION
Before delving into the task of categorizing the basis of corporate
behavior, it is useful to reflect upon how the modern corporation
evolved in America. This is more than a mere academic exercise as it is
important to understand what role the corporation has played in
American history to understand its current status.6 And, as we will see,
this status is essential to understanding what drives corporate behavior.
A. Historical Underpinnings of the Corporation
Though the earliest forms of the corporation can be traced as far back
as Roman times,7 it did not begin to take on its current form in America
until the mid-to-late nineteenth century with the emergence of general
See, e.g., Sarah H. Duggin & Stephen M. Goldman, Restoring Trust in Corporate
Directors: The Disney Standard and the “New” Good Faith, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 211, 219 (2006)
(reviewing the development of the corporation in America to explain how the law has
struggled with holding directors accountable).
7
1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS
§ 1 at 3 (Carol A. Jones ed., 2006); Douglas Arner, Development of the American Law of
Corporations to 1832, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 23, 25 (2002).
6
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incorporation statutes.8 The earliest forms of the corporation in America
came by specific charters from the states in the late eighteenth century,
which were carried-over from the colonial days when corporations
obtained charters directly from the King of England.9 Corporations were
formed with limited purposes and even time limits within which they
could operate.10 The typical corporation would be formed to complete
some specific task, such as to build a canal or bridge, and would only be
given a charter for a period of five, twenty, or thirty years.11 The number
of corporations was also extremely limited, with only 335 granted in the
entire eighteenth century, 181 of which were granted between 1796 and
1800.12 Most of these were chartered for some specific aspect of the
public good, such as building utilities, and very few were for
manufacturing purposes.13
The early limitations placed upon corporations were in large part a
result of the inherent distrust that the public had for the corporation.14
Corporations at that time were monopolistic by their very nature
because they maintained exclusive control over some public asset or
business opportunity.15 There were also concerns over the concentration
of wealth that was centered in a corporation.16 As Justice Brandeis
recounted in his dissent in the chain store tax case of Louis K. Liggett Co.
v. Leeu,17
There was a sense of some insidious menace inherent in
large aggregations of capital, particularly when held by
corporations. So at first the corporate privilege was

8
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 130, 390; Susan P. Hamill, From Special Privilege to General
Utility: A Continuation of Willard Hurst’s Study of Corporations, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 81, 84-85,
104-06 (1999).
9
Hamill, supra note 8, at 88 (“Corporations always have been creatures of statute,
requiring a formal recognition normally evidenced by a corporate charter issued by a
sovereign person or government.”) (citation omitted); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at
129-30.
10
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 131-32.
11
Id.
12
Id. at 129; FLETCHER, supra note 7, § 2 at 8 (“The cloud of disfavor under which
corporations labored in America was not dissipated until near the end of the eighteenth
century, and during the last 11 years of that period, the total number of charters granted
did not exceed 200.”).
13
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 130-32, 134 (noting that a “mere handful” of these early
corporations were established for manufacturing purposes); ESTES, supra note 5, at 22-24.
14
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 132.
15
Id.
16
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 549 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17
288 U.S. 517 (1933).
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granted sparingly; and only when the grant seemed
necessary in order to procure for the community some
specific benefit otherwise unattainable.18
However, while public suspicion of corporations may have
remained,19 economic necessity altered the limited grant of the corporate
privilege in the nineteenth century.
One of the most significant changes was the shift of granting
corporate status via special charter by the state legislatures to the
enactment of general incorporation statutes. At the start of the
nineteenth century, corporations were still relatively rare, and the special
charter system made sense.20 However, as the country grew, the practice
of issuing special charters became burdensome.21 As legal historian
Lawrence Friedman describes,
In theory, the special charter system was a good way to
control corporations. But the demand for charters, in the
end, got to be too heavy. By the 1840s and 1850s, it
would have swamped the legislatures, if the process had
not become so routine. Even so, state session laws
bulged with special charters. Time was wasted in the
drudge work of issuing, amending, and extending
hundreds of charters. In the rush, there was little time to
supervise those charters that perhaps needed
supervision.22
To combat this problem, states began enacting general incorporation
statutes.23 In 1809, Massachusetts passed a general incorporation act for
manufacturing companies, and New York soon followed with its own
general incorporation statute in 1811.24 By the 1850s, over twenty states

Id. at 549 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Id.
20
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134.
21
Margaret M. Blair, Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 426 (2003) (noting that by the
1820s, demand by business people for corporate charters was growing rapidly).
22
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134.
23
Id.; Blair, supra note 21, at 425-26.
24
Blair, supra note 21, at 425-26; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134 (noting that New
York is generally credited as the first to enact a general incorporation law for business
corporations).
18
19
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had passed general incorporation statutes,25 and by 1875, general
incorporation laws were available in virtually every state.26
Though general incorporation laws were available, the special
charter system did not entirely disappear, and, indeed, many
incorporators still chose the special charter route.27 Although most every
state had a general incorporation statute or law by 1875, only eighteen
states had prohibited special charters.28 The reasons for electing to
incorporate by special charter varied from concerns over the prestige of
being incorporated under a general incorporation statute to more seedy
motives, such as securing favorable arrangements from the state that
would not be available to others.29 Ultimately, concerns over such
behavior and a weakening of confidence in public officials led to state
constitutional prohibitions on special charters.30 However, the practice
continued in many states early into the twentieth century.31
During the nineteenth century, the corporate form as we know it
today also began to take shape.
The basic characteristics of a
corporation—entity status with perpetual life, separation of ownership
from management and limited liability—all began to take hold in the
minds of American jurists and scholars.32 The view of the corporation
was expressed early in the nineteenth century by Justice Marshall in the
seminal case of Dartmouth College v. Woodward.33 In Dartmouth College,
the Supreme Court was faced with whether the state of New Hampshire
could unilaterally alter the charter originally granted to Dartmouth
College’s trustees by the British Crown in 1769.34 In 1816, New
Hampshire passed an act which attempted to transform Dartmouth
College into Dartmouth University.35 The most significant part of the act
altered the mode of governance provided in the college’s original charter
by increasing the size of the board of trustees from twelve to twenty-one
and provided that the new members would be appointed by the
Blair, supra note 21, at 426.
Hamill, supra note 8, at 123.
27
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135.
28
Hamill, supra note 8, at 123.
29
Id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135 (commenting that “[t]here were unscrupulous
incorporators, and there were recurrent bribery scandals.”).
30
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135; Hamill, supra note 8, at 123-27.
31
Hamill, supra note 8, at 127-29.
32
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 135; HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN
LAW 1836-1937 49-50 (1991); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 636 (1819).
33
17 U.S. 518 (1819).
34
Id. at 624-26.
35
Id. at 626.
25
26
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governor.36 The existing trustees objected and brought suit, claiming
that the New Hampshire act violated the Contract Clause of the United
States Constitution.37
The Supreme Court agreed with the trustees and found that the
charter was in fact a contract between Dartmouth College and the state.38
In the course of his analysis, Justice Marshall set forth what it meant
legally to be a corporation, stating:
A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law. Being the
mere creature of law, it possesses only those properties
which the charter of its creation confers upon it, either
expressly or as incidental to its very existence. These are
such as are supposed best calculated to effect the object
for which it was created. Among the most important are
immortality, and, if the expression may be allowed,
individuality; properties, by which a perpetual
succession of many persons are considered as the same,
and may act as a single individual. They enable a
corporation to manage its own affairs, and to hold
property without the perplexing intricacies, the
hazardous and endless necessity, of perpetual
conveyance for the purpose of transmitting it from hand
to hand. . . . By these means, a perpetual succession of
individuals are capable of acting for the promotion of
the particular object, like one immortal being. But this
being does not share in the civil government of the
country, unless that be the purpose for which it is
created. Its immortality no more confers on it political
power, or a political character, than immortality would
confer such power or character on a natural person. It is
no more a state instrument than a natural person
exercising the same powers would be.39

36
Id.; R. Kent Newmyer, John Marshall as a Transitional Jurist: Dartmouth College v.
Woodward and the Limits of Omniscient Judging, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1665, 1666 (2000).
37
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 626-27.
38
Id. at 627 (“It can require no argument to prove that the circumstances of this case
constitute a contract.”).
39
Id. at 636.
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Justice Marshall’s opinion essentially became the starting point for
the developing law of corporations.40 Though the decision in Dartmouth
College did not specifically analyze a business corporation, the result was
understood to go beyond simply a small college charter.41 The Court’s
ultimate conclusion was that a charter was a valid contract that could not
be unilaterally altered by the state in violation of the Contract Clause,
just as the state could not unilaterally alter a contract with an
individual.42
While some predicted that the Dartmouth College case signified a
sweeping change in the relationship between the state and the
corporation, its effect on corporate law turned out to be less significant.43
As Justice Story had pointed out in his concurrence in Dartmouth College,
if the state wished to alter the terms of a corporate charter after granting
such charter, such authority “must be reserved in the grant.”44
Apparently, the states took this advice to heart, as it soon became a part
of multiple state incorporation statutes.45 Although this effectively
overruled Dartmouth College, in actuality, the states exercised little
control over their corporate creations.46 This is not surprising because
the very nature of general incorporation and the subsequent increased
number of corporations militated against the state legislatures’ ability to
regulate individually each corporation it created.47 By the close of the

See Gregory A. Mark, The Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 1441, 1450 (1987) (noting that the language and structure of Justice
Marshall’s opinion were followed throughout the nineteenth century); Arner, supra note 7,
at 50 (stating that Marshall’s opinion, as modified by Justice Story’s concurrence, became
the “starting point by Joseph Angell and Samuel Ames in their Treatise on the Law of
Private Corporations Aggregate”) (citation omitted).
41
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 136.
42
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 643-46.
43
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 137.
44
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 712 (Story, J. concurring).
In my judgment it is perfectly clear that any act of a legislature which
takes away any powers or franchises vested by its charter in a private
corporation or its corporate officers, or which restrains or controls the
legitimate exercise of them, or transfers them to other persons, without
its assent, is a violation of the obligations of that charter. If the
legislature mean[s] [sic] to claim such an authority, it must be reserved in
the grant.
Id. (emphasis added).
45
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 137; Mark, supra note 40, at 1454 (“The legislatures
immediately began to include clauses reserving to the state the power to amend or repeal
the charters that they granted.”).
46
Mark, supra note 40, at 1454 .
47
Id.
40
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nineteenth century, charter-based regulation had failed, and corporate
behavior began to be governed by more general regulations.48
B. The Development of Corporate Law in the Late Nineteenth and Twentieth
Centuries
With the advent of the corporation transforming from a special
franchise of the state to a private business organization, state control
over each individual corporation diminished.49 By the close of the
nineteenth century, shareholders, rather than the state, became
responsible for disciplining corporate managers and directors, but the
standard of manager behavior had gradually declined throughout the
nineteenth century.50 As Herbert Hovenkamp recounts, “by 1890 those
in control of the corporation were legally answerable for virtually
nothing but illegality, clearly ultra vires acts . . . or gross negligence.”51
The environment for investors was also turbulent in the late nineteenth
century. As Lawrence Friedman describes, “[t]he investment market
was totally unregulated; no SEC [Security Exchange Commission] kept it
honest, and the level of morality among promoters was painfully low, to
put it mildly. . . . The investing public was unmercifully fleeced.”52
However, this would all soon change.
1.

The Curbing of Corporate Behavior

Throughout the late nineteenth century and continuing through to
modern day, much of corporate law was developed through a pattern of
public outcry followed by legislative action. In some cases, this was
precipitated by a single event, while in other cases, a general distrust of
corporate power initiated the action. An example of the latter can be
found in the development of the antitrust laws.
At the close of the nineteenth century, there was a growing distrust
of the amount of power held by corporations.53 The growth of major
corporations after the Civil War increased the long-held fear of
monopoly amongst the public, particularly amongst farmers, workers,
and small businessmen.54 In response to these fears, the Sherman Act
Id. at 1445; HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 56.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 56.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 391; Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 222 (quoting
Friedman).
53
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 346.
54
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 346; HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 241.
48
49
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was passed as a means of breaking-up the so-called “trusts” which were
viewed as restricting trade and competition.55 The Sherman Act’s early
history was shaky, with courts narrowly interpreting the Act.56
However, under President Theodore Roosevelt, enforcement of the Act
received a boost, and subsequent victories in the Supreme Court as well
as the establishment of the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
passage of the Clayton Act helped to transform the antitrust laws into
meaningful regulations.57 Today, antitrust concerns are not near the
level of hysteria that evoked the regulation, but the laws have more of a
real effect.58 As Lawrence Friedman has noted, early in American history
individuals such as “John D. Rockefeller could swallow up competitors
at will; the modern merger barons must humbly beg permission.”59
While the antitrust movement was in reaction to a fear of the
economic power of the corporation, more often corporate law developed
as a reaction to everyday corporate behavior.60 A classic example is in
the development of the food and drug laws. While individual states had
their own regulations, Congress was compelled to pass such laws in the
wake of Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle, which described in
graphic detail the hellish conditions of meatpacking plants in Chicago.61
The novel generated such disgust and public outcry that President
Theodore Roosevelt hired investigators, who confirmed much of the
novel, and the Food and Drug Act swiftly sailed through Congress.62
This pattern of curbing unethical corporate behavior continued
throughout the twentieth century.63 For example, around the same time
as the Food and Drug Act’s passage, Congress passed worker’s
compensation and safety regulation laws, largely in reaction to safety
concerns over the operation of the railroads.64 Additionally, the
55
Id. As Friedman notes, the use of the word “trust” was a vestige, as holding
companies were actually used, rather than trusts, to put monopolies together. Id.
56
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW IN THE 20TH CENTURY 55 (2002) [hereinafter
“FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY”].
57
Id. at 55-59; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 349.
58
FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 392-93.
59
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 349.
60
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 392 (“The law of corporation, as such, deals less with the
economic power of corporations than with their everyday behavior.”).
61
FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 60-61; see also U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, The 1906 Food and Drugs Act and Its Enforcement, available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/historyoffda/section1.html (crediting Sinclair’s book as the final
precipitating force behind a comprehensive food and drug law).
62
FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 60-61.
63
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 559-61.
64
FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 62.
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Securities Act of 193365 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193466 were
enacted to address abuses in the issuance and trading of securities,
which were seen as helping to cause the great stock market crash of
1929.67 More recently, much of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed as a
response to the latest spate of corporate scandals that plagued the
beginning of the twenty-first century.68 A general theme that seems to
have developed through these regulations is that corporations cannot be
trusted to police or regulate themselves, and, therefore, external
pressures must be applied.
2.

The Relationship between Management and Shareholders

At the close of the nineteenth century, corporate managers and
directors were virtually answerable for nothing short of illegal or ultra
vires acts. However, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, courts
began to recognize a method by which shareholders could sue the
corporate directors—the derivative suit.
The derivative suit, or
stockholder’s suit, is an action typically brought by shareholders on
behalf of the corporation against “a third party (usu[ally] a corporate
officer) because of the corporation’s failure to take some action against
the third party.” 69 Shareholder challenges to ultra vires acts were first
recognized in the 1830s and 1840s, but the derivative suit did not begin
to emerge until the 1850s.70 Eventually, as ultra vires challenges became
less relevant,71 the derivative suits began to focus on the duties owed by
the directors of a corporation.
The derivative suit as it relates to the duties owed to the
shareholders by corporate directors initially emerged from the law of
trusts.72 The basis of the relationship was that corporate management
15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a-77aa (West 2006).
Id. at §§ 78a-78mm.
67
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 222; Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (“A fundamental purpose, common to these
statutes, was to substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor
and thus to achieve a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”).
68
Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Beyond Protection: Invigorating Incentives for Sarbanes-Oxley
Corporate and Securities Fraud Whistleblowers, 87 B.U. L. REV. 91, 92 (2007).
69
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004); Model Business Corporation Act § 7.40(1)
(2003) (“‘Derivative proceeding’ mean[s] a civil suit in the right of a domestic
corporation . . . .”); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 393; LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & PETER V.
LETSOU, BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 514 (4th ed. 2003).
70
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 60-61; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 393 (noting that the
concept received a “push” by the Supreme Court in Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. 331 (1856)).
71
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 396.
72
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 223.
65
66

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/3

Marks: Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate "

2008]

Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation

1139

was a trustee, or guardian, of every shareholder and thus was bound by
a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.73 As the trustee
model evolved, this fiduciary obligation emerged as having two basic
components: a duty of loyalty and a duty of care.74 The duty of loyalty
required that the directors place the corporation before their own
interests,75 but the duty of care was more difficult to define as courts
struggled with what level of discretion corporate managers should be
given in running the company.76 The ultimate standard that emerged
was the business judgment rule.
The business judgment rule essentially frees management to run the
corporation as it sees fit.77 Under the rule, directors cannot be held liable
to shareholders for mere errors in judgment, no matter how gross, so
long as the decisions were made in good faith and in the ordinary course
of business.78 The effect of the rule is that it prevents courts and
shareholders from second-guessing the business decisions of directors.79
The interplay of the duty of care and the limits of the business judgment
rule are well illustrated in the case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.80
In Dodge, the plaintiffs, primarily led by brothers John and Horace
Dodge, who were minority shareholders in Ford Motor Company,
brought suit against the directors.81 Prior to the suit, Ford had enjoyed
many years of success which enabled Ford to pay special dividends
totaling $41 million from December, 1911, through October, 1915, as well
as a regular dividend of five percent per month on the existing $2 million
capital.82 However, in 1916, Henry Ford, who owned 58% of the Ford
Motor Company stock, declared that no more special dividends would
be paid and that the earnings would instead be put back into the
company.83 Henry Ford announced his motives in a press release to the
city of Detroit, stating,

Id.; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 393.
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 224.
75
Id.; Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (describing the duty of loyalty
as requiring “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”).
76
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 62 (“During the second half of the [nineteenth] century
a deep division emerged in state courts over the appropriate standard for directors’
exercise of their business judgment.”).
77
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 396.
78
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 62; FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 396.
79
Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 225.
80
170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
81
Id. at 669.
82
Id. at 670.
83
Id. at 671.
73
74
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My ambition . . . is to employ still more men; to spread
the benefits of this industrial system to the greatest
possible number, to help them build up their lives and
their homes. To do this, we are putting the greatest share
of our profits back into the business.84
Based on this and other comments by Henry Ford, the plaintiffs sued
to enjoin Ford from expanding its operations by building a smelting
plant and to compel Ford to issue a special dividend of 75% of the $54
million surplus.85 After a hearing, the lower court agreed with the
plaintiffs, enjoined Ford Motor Company’s use of the surplus to expand
its operations, and ordered a special dividend to be issued.86
On appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’
claims that Ford Motor Company had illegally expanded beyond the
authorized amount of capital provided by statute and also rejected the
plaintiffs’ claim that the expansion of the corporation’s business into a
smelting plant was ultra vires.87 However, the court initially seemed
sympathetic to the plaintiffs’ claims that Ford’s expansion and
withholding of special dividends was primarily for humanitarian, rather
than business reasons.88 In reviewing Henry Ford’s testimony and legal
precedence, the court stated:
His testimony creates the impression, also, that he thinks
the Ford Motor Company has made too much money,
has had too large profits, and that, although large profits
might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public,
by reducing the price of the output of the company,
ought to be undertaken. We have no doubt that certain
sentiments, philanthropic and altruistic, creditable to
Mr. Ford, had large influence in determining the policy
to be pursued by the Ford Motor Company–the policy
which has been herein referred to.
Id.
Id. at 672-74.
86
Id. 677-78.
87
Id. at 679-81. At the time, Michigan had in effect a statute limiting the amount of
capital stock for a corporation organizing under Michigan law to $25 million, which was
later increased to $50 million. Id. at 679-80. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the
statute did not limit the amount of capital a corporation could amass after formation. Id. at
680.
88
Id. at 683 (“It is the contention of plaintiffs that the apparent effect of the plan is
intended to be . . . to continue the corporation henceforth as a semi-eleemosynary
institution and not as a business institution.”).
84
85
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....
There should be no confusion (of which there is
evidence) of the duties which Mr. Ford conceives that he
and the stockholders owe to the general public and the
duties which in law he and his codirectors owe to
protesting, minority stockholders.
A business
corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the
profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors
are to be employed for that end. The discretion of
directors is to be exercised in the choice of means to
attain that end, and does not extend to a change in the
end itself, to the reduction of profits, or to the
nondistribution of profits among stockholders in order
to devote them to other purposes.89
Despite this statement, however, the court went on to reverse the
lower court’s injunction on the expansion of Ford’s business operations,
holding that the court should not “interfere with the proposed expansion
of the business. . . . The judges are not business experts.”90 In upholding
the directors’ decision to expand, the court noted that this goal did not
appear to harm the interests of the shareholders.91 Though the court
reversed the injunction, it did affirm a portion of the trial court’s order
requiring a distribution of approximately $20 million of the cash surplus,
finding that even with some of the money being diverted to the
expansion of operations, the surplus was great enough that it was the
directors’ duty to distribute “a very large sum of money to stockholders”
in the form of a dividend.92 Thus, the Dodge case demonstrates both the
duty of care owed by corporate directors–through the affirmation of the
special dividend–and the application of the business judgment rule–
through the reversal of the injunction against expansion.93

Id. at 683-84.
Id. at 684.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 685 (citations omitted).
93
As an interesting side note, some of Ford’s motives may not have been as altruistic as
articulated. The principle plaintiffs in the case, the Dodge brothers, were originally the
manufacturers of the Ford chassis but in 1912, Ford started making its own chassis.
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 383. It appears Ford was attempting to undercut the
prices of his stockholders and competitors as well as deny them dividends which were in
effect helping fund the competition. After this case, Ford announced he would sell a $250
automobile and was then able to purchase the Dodge brothers’ stock for $25 million (down
$10 million from the Dodge brothers’ initial asking price). Id.
89
90
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While the business judgment rule was applied in Dodge to justify
expenditures on business expansion, the rule has been applied in a
variety of other areas. As one commentator has noted:
Pursuant to the Rule, courts generally defer to decisions
taken by corporate directors, whether they relate to
mergers and acquisitions, paying out of dividends,
charitable donations, or executive compensation, as long
as: (1) a business decision was made, (2) in good faith,
(3) after the director reasonably informed herself, and (4)
the director had no financial interest in the decision at
issue.94
While courts continue to struggle with the exact application of the
business judgment rule,95 the result, in most cases, is that corporate
management is, at least legally, not liable for its good faith business
decisions. This liberalization of the business judgment rule gave
relatively more discretion to the corporate managers than to the
shareholders who technically owned the company.96
This phenomenon was famously announced by Adolph Berle and
Gardiner Means in their 1932 book, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property.97 The Berle-Means thesis argued that the sharp division
between corporate ownership and control led to management becoming
the effective owners of a corporation.98 The implicit economic problem
of the thesis is that corporate managers could act in their own selfinterests or for some purpose other than profit maximization and thus
not in the interest of the owners of the corporation, i.e. the shareholders.99
Minority shareholders of large corporations could not efficiently monitor
the managers; thus, such abuses could go unchecked.100 This concern
helped bring about federal reforms such as the federal proxy

94
D.A. Jeremy Telman, The Business Judgment Rule, Disclosure, and Executive
Compensation, 81 TUL. L. REV. 829, 831-32 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
95
Id. at 833-39 (noting the confusion over the business judgment rule as either an
evidentiary presumption, standard of review, or abstention doctrine); see also Stephen M.
Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 84 (2004).
96
HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 63.
97
ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 119-25 (17th prtg. 1950); FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 390.
98
BERELE & MEANS, supra note 97, at 119-25; FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at
390.
99
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 254-55; FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56,
at 390; HOVENKAMP, supra note 32, at 306.
100
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 255.
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regulations.101 However, while the Berle-Means thesis remains a widely
cited work, it is also the subject of criticism.102 Shareholders are not
entirely powerless, as Lawrence Freidman has noted, because they “can
vote with their feet, so to speak; and when share prices fall, and
stockholders sell, management is in deep, deep trouble.”103 As will be
discussed below, this concern for share price and profit is a limiting
factor on corporate managers who wish to spend the firm’s money on
charitable causes.104
III. DEFINING “CONSCIENCE” AS IT RELATES TO “GOOD” BEHAVIOR
With a firm grasp of the corporation’s historical roots and evolution,
we can turn to the task of understanding what it means for a corporation
to have a “conscience.” Black’s Dictionary defines “conscience” as:
“[t]he moral sense; the faculty of judging the moral qualities of actions,
or of discriminating between right and wrong; . . . [t]he sense of right
and wrong inherent in every person by virtue of his existence as a social
entity; good conscience being a synonym of equity.”105 Webster’s offers
a slightly different definition: “knowledge or feeling of right and wrong;
the faculty, power, or principle of a person which decides on the
lawfulness or unlawfulness of his actions, with a compulsion to do right;
moral judgment that prohibits or opposes the violation of a previously
recognized ethical principle.”106 From these definitions we can glean a
couple of themes: (1) a conscience involves the ability to make a choice
based on a moral sense or feeling; and (2) a conscience involves the
ability to determine right from wrong and comport behavior
accordingly.
These themes pose some interesting hurdles when
applying the term to a corporation. First, given that the quality of
having a moral sense or feeling is generally human, can it even be
applied to a non-human corporation? And, given the subjective nature
of right and wrong, what does it mean for a corporation to choose
“right?”

Id. at 269.
William W. Bratton, Berle and Means Reconsidered at the Century’s Turn, 26 J. CORP. L.
737, 737-38, 754-55 (2000); FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 390.
103
FRIEDMAN, 20TH CENTURY, supra note 56, at 390.
104
See infra Part III.
105
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (6th ed. 1991). Interestingly, the more recent eighth
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary is less nuanced, defining “conscience” more concisely as
“[t]he moral sense of right or wrong; esp., a moral sense applied to one’s own judgment
and actions.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 322 (8th ed. 2004). I have chosen to use the more
detailed definition provided in the sixth edition.
106
WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 387 (2d ed. 1979).
101
102
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A. Can Corporations Make “Conscience” Choices?
Most definitions of a “conscience” involve a uniquely human
characteristic to determine right from wrong based on an internal
“feeling” or “moral sense.” But, corporations are obviously not human.
Indeed, from their inception, corporations have been viewed by the
public as soulless.107 It has been feared that a corporation’s perpetual
life, large size, and limited liability could act to “aggregate the worst
urges of whole groups of men,” with no sense of morality to temper its
powers.108 Lawrence Mitchell has analogized the corporation to Rabbi
Judah Loew’s Golem, stating that, like the Golem, “which came to life to
protect the Jewish people once the right words were inserted into its ear,
the modern American corporation knows only one thing [profit
maximization]. . . . So we have the paradox of having created an artificial
creature with all of the rights of natural persons to formulate and pursue
ends that give its life meaning, but without the ability to choose and
pursue those ends.”109 Or, if we return to the analogy at the beginning of
this Article, the corporation is akin to Pinocchio, in that it is an artificial
entity, created by man.110 However, even if a corporation is “soulless,” it
is made up of and run by human beings.111 And, though the corporation
does not have a “conscience” in the traditional sense,112 clearly,
corporations do make choices that have an impact, positive or negative,
on society.

FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134.
Id.
109
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 44.
110
See id. at 43 (“[Corporations] are special kinds of people; people created not by God
but by law and humans. As such, and in contrast to the Enlightenment vision of
autonomous man, they have only the ends given to them by their creators.”).
111
FRIEDMAN, supra note 3, at 134; Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business, in
THE ESSENCE OF FRIEDMAN 36-37 (Kurt R. Leube ed., 1987) (noting that corporate
responsible behavior must refer to the corporate executives); see also MITCHELL, supra note
5, at 13, 43-44.
112
Cf. Friedman, supra note 111, at 36. Milton Friedman, in discussing whether
“business” can have responsibilities, urges that they cannot, at least not in the traditional
sense, stating:
What does it mean to say that “business” has responsibilities? Only
people can have responsibilities. A corporation is an artificial person
and in this sense may have artificial responsibilities, but “business” as
a whole cannot be said to have responsibilities, even in this vague
sense.
Id.
107
108
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The Individual in the Corporation

So, are these choices driven purely by the whims and conscience of
management? Probably not, as corporate managers can still be held
accountable for their actions. Though an individual may wish to act
generously with corporate funds, he or she cannot treat corporate
monies and possessions as his or her own.113 For instance, in Worthington
v. Worthington,114 Henry R. Worthington, president of a corporation
which manufactured and sold hydraulic machinery, agreed to donate
equipment to Columbia University’s hydraulic laboratory.115 In a letter
agreeing to the donation, Henry Worthington used language that
appeared to indicate that he personally was willing to donate the
machinery and asked that the donation be identified with his father’s
name.116 The corporation sued to recover the value of the equipment
from Henry Worthington, claiming the donation was not an authorized
expenditure.117
The court agreed, finding that despite Henry
Worthington’s being president and a large shareholder, he could not,
“by virtue of his office, give away the [corporation’s] property.”118 The
court clearly took issue with the express individual gratification Henry
Worthington received from the donation as articulated by his own words
in a letter to Columbia University.119

See, e.g., Rice v. Wheeling Dollar Sav. & Trust Co., 130 N.E.2d 442, 449 (Ohio C.P. 1954)
(holding that contribution, at insistence of officers and directors, to a charitable corporation
in memory of president’s mother without notification to all shareholders, was an
unsanctioned use of corporate funds). Cf. Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d
398, 403-04 (Del. Ch. 1969) (holding that where president placed his own interest above that
of the company’s by selling a stock exchange seat previously purchased with corporate
funds for personal profit, president was accountable to the company for the profit made).
Though the Theodora court found that the business judgment rule did not protect the
president for the sale of a stock exchange seat at a personal profit, it held the rule did
protect a large gift made to a charitable foundation. Id. at 405.
114
Henry R. Worthington v. Worthington, 91 N.Y.S. 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1905).
115
Id. at 444-45.
116
Id. at 444.
117
Id. at 445.
118
Id. at 444-45.
119
Id. at 445.
It was a laudable and commendable thing for the defendant to make
the gift, not only for the purpose of promulgating knowledge in
mechanical engineering, but in perpetuating his father’s memory. In
doing this, however, he was obligated to use his own property, and not
that of another. . . . [T]here is nothing in the record which would justify
a finding that any action was taken by the corporation which could be
construed into its giving the materials and making the expenditure as a
gift.
Id. (emphasis added).
113
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What may have played an even larger role in the decision, however,
was the failure to have the corporation approve and endorse the action,
so that the donation would appear to be one based upon the business
judgment of the corporation.120 Indeed, in other scenarios, even when
the benefit to the corporation has been speculative, courts have been
reluctant to intervene with the business affairs of a corporation. An
example of such reluctance can be seen in the oft-cited case of Shlensky v.
Wrigley.121 In Shlensky, the plaintiff, a minority shareholder of the
Chicago National League Ball Club (which operated the Cub’s home
baseball park of Wrigley Field), sued the directors for failing to install
lights at Wrigley Field so that night games could be played.122 For those
unfamiliar with baseball, Wrigley Field was, at the time of the lawsuit, as
it is today, located in a heavily residential neighborhood on the north
side of Chicago.123 At the time of the suit, Wrigley Field was the only
major league park not equipped with lights, and so night games could
not be played.124 The plaintiff alleged that the decision not to install
lights was costing the corporation revenues that would have resulted
from the increase in attendance of night games, and that the decision not
to install the lights was not based on financial welfare or interests of the
corporation.125 Instead, the plaintiff claimed the decision was based on
the personal position of the president, Philip K. Wrigley, that the
installation of lights and night baseball games would have a
“deteriorating effect upon the surrounding neighborhood.”126 Despite
these allegations, the appellate court refused to reverse the trial court’s
dismissal of the case, based in part upon the business judgment rule.127
Instead, the court found that the directors’ actions could be consistent
with the best interests of the corporation, stating,
[W]e are not satisfied that the motives assigned to Philip
K. Wrigley, and through him to the other directors, are
contrary to the best interests of the corporation and the
stockholders. For example, it appears to us that the
effect on the surrounding neighborhood might well be

Id.; see also In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967-68 (Del. Ch.
1996) (noting that the business judgment rule is process oriented).
121
Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
122
Id. at 777.
123
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 378.
124
Shlensky, 237 N.E.2d at 777.
125
Id. at 778.
126
Id. Wrigley was also allegedly motivated by his view that baseball was a “daytime
sport.” Id.
127
Id. at 780.
120
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considered by a director who was considering the
patrons who would or would not attend the games if the
park were in a poor neighborhood. Furthermore, the
long run interest of the corporation in its property value
at Wrigley Field might demand all efforts to keep the
neighborhood from deteriorating.128
As can be seen in the Shlensky case, courts can be, and often are,
reluctant to interfere with the decisions of the directors, even when the
motives appear purely altruistic.129 Indeed, as will be explored later,
many activities that appear altruistic in fact can benefit the corporation
as well.130 Furthermore, many modern state rules, with regard to
corporate giving, have removed the need of a court to find a business
purpose by essentially sanctioning charitable donations and protecting
corporate directors from scrutiny so long as their decisions are made in
good faith.131
In practice, corporate giving is, essentially, free of any legal
restrictions.132 Although directors can often justify charitable donations

Id. As an aside, lights were eventually installed at Wrigley Field. As Larry Ribstein
and Peter Letsou note, rather sarcastically:
The inexorable tide of progress finally brought lights to Wrigley Field
in 1988.
The first night game was scheduled for August 8,
1988. . . . Cub greats Billy Williams and Ernie Banks threw out the first
pitches. Thunderstorms accompanied by fierce dramatic lightening
stopped the game in the fourth inning. Speculation as to the cause of
the storm is beyond the scope of this book.
RIBSTEIN & LETSOU, supra note 69, at 380.
129
Greene County Nat. Farm Loan Ass’n v. Fed. Land Bank of Louisville, 57 F. Supp. 783,
789 (W.D. Ky. 1944); A. P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 586-87 (N.J. 1953)
(holding that corporate power to make reasonable charitable contributions exists even
apart from express statutory provisions).
130
See infra Part IV.B.
131
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. Tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2006) (allowing corporations to eliminate
or limit the personal liability of a director to a corporation or stockholder for breach of
fiduciary duty except in limited circumstances such as, inter alia, acts or omissions not in
good faith). Soon after Delaware enacted this statute, other states followed, and now all
fifty states have similar provisions. See also Duggin & Goldman, supra note 6, at 233-34;
Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 767-68
(2005) (noting that “[t]wenty-four states (including Delaware) authorize ‘donations for the
public welfare or for charitable, scientific, or educational purposes.’”); Revised Model Bus.
Corp. Act §§ 3.02(13), (15) (2002) (authorizing donations “further[ing] the business and
affairs of the corporation,” and donations for “charitable, scientific or educational
purposes.”).
132
David L. Engel, An Approach to Corporate Social Responsibility, 32 STAN. L. REV. 1, 16-17
(1979) (“As a practical matter, the business judgment defense is unlikely to fail in the
128
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and the like under the business judgment rule, legal impediments are not
their only concern. At the end of the day, the corporation must make a
profit.133 The individuals who run a corporation may very well wish to
act with their own conscience but can, and often are, limited by the
mandate that the corporation maximize shareholder wealth.134 But, is
shareholder wealth or profit maximization necessarily a bad thing?135
The degree to which directors should seek to maximize the profits of the
corporation versus engaging in socially responsible behavior is the
subject of much debate.
2.

Conscience and the Corporate Social Responsibility Debate

The corporate social responsibility (“CSR”) debate began as early as
the 1930s,136 but has garnered much attention over the past 20 years.137
At one far end of the debate is the view that the only responsibility
corporate directors have is to make a profit for their shareholders. This
view is often represented by the economist Milton Friedman, who wrote
that, in a free economy, “there is one and only one social responsibility of
business–to use its resources and engage in activities designed to
increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the game, which
is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or
fraud.”138 The flip side of this argument is that corporations–which owe
their very existence, including characteristics such as limited liability, to
society–owe a reciprocal duty to non-shareholders and to society.139

absence of conflicts of interest, extraordinary amounts of profit foregone, or some other
affirmative suggestion of bad faith.”) (citation omitted).
133
MITCHELL, supra note 5, at 11 (noting that “profit is essential to corporate survival”)
(emphasis in original).
134
Id. at 44.
135
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder Wealth Maximization
Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423 (1993) (arguing that corporate
decision makers cannot, or at the very least should not, attempt to serve the interest of two
masters, i.e. shareholders and nonshareholders).
136
Jill E. Fisch, The “Bad Man” Goes to Washington: The Effect of Political Influence on
Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1601 (2006) (crediting Merrick Dodd for the
scholarly roots of the CSR discussion in 1932).
137
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Roles of Corporations and Corporate Officers, 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.
PROC. 265, 265 (2005) (noting that the phrase CSR has only developed as an aspect of public
debate since the early 1990s).
138
MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (1962); see also Friedman, supra note
111, at 36-38.
139
William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO
L. REV. 261, 265 (1992). Allen describes two characterizations of the corporation. The first
is a property model, whereby the corporation is viewed as the property of the
shareholders, and his view epitomizes the Friedman view of CSR and the corporation. The
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Complicating the CSR debate is that the term itself can mean
different things.140 As Cynthia Williams has noted, “[l]egal academics
have struggled to produce useful definitions of CSR, and in that effort
may be well advised to look to management literature.”141 This
management literature comprises CSR into four types, “(1) the economic
responsibility to be profitable; (2) the legal responsibility to abide by the
laws of society; (3) the ethical responsibility to do what is right, just, and
fair; and (4) the philanthropic responsibility to contribute to various
kinds of social, educational, recreational, or cultural purposes.”142 Other
definitions are not as broad, however, and some scholars exclude from
CSR activities that tend to benefit the corporation, even if it costs the
corporation money in the short-term.143 Ultimately, how CSR is defined
and whether it is right or wrong for a company to engage in CSR
activities is not within the scope of this Article. What is important,
however, is what the CSR debate represents, i.e. recognition that
corporations have the ability to choose to engage, or not engage, in
behavior that benefits some entity, group, or individual other than just
the corporation.
But, returning to the initial question of whether this means
corporations can have a conscience, do corporations engage in this
behavior based on an internal “feeling” or “moral sense?” Even though
corporate managers can make decisions based on such human qualities,
it may not be the case that what one corporate manager chooses to do is
based on the same “moral sense” as other decision-makers within the
company.144 And, even if those managers wish to act based on their own
internal moral senses or feelings of what is right or wrong, as has been
already noted above, other factors, such as making a profit, also
influence corporate behavior. The factors that influence corporate
behavior will be discussed in more detail below, but with regard to
second view is of the corporation as a social institution, “tinged with a public purpose.”
Id.; see also Fisch, supra note 136, at 1601-02.
140
Veronica Besmer, The Legal Character of Private Codes of Conduct: More Than Just a
Pseudo-Formal Gloss on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2 HAST. BUS. L.J. 279, 280 (2006)
(noting that CSR means different things to different people).
141
Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1647, n.54
(2006).
142
Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting Dirk Matten & Andrew Crane, Corporate Citizenship:
Toward an Extended Theoretical Conceptualization, 30 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 166, 167 (2005)).
143
Engel, supra note 132, at 9; see also, Friedman, supra note 111, at 40-41.
144
See Fisch, supra note 136, at 1603 (“The corporation cannot readily adopt the moral
perspective of its individual constituents. . . . various corporate stakeholders may have
differing moral perspectives”). Fisch further notes that corporate managers’ ethical views
may not mirror those of society. Id.
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having a conscience, it appears that a corporation is indeed without an
internal conscience in the literal sense. But as has already been
discussed, corporations do make social choices and those choices are
influenced by external factors stemming, at least in part, from the
corporation’s status as a social entity (if we borrow from the Black’s
definition). So, perhaps the corporation does not have an internal
conscience, but like Pinocchio, has an external one. However, instead of
Jiminy Cricket, the corporation’s “conscience” is a complex combination
and interaction of social and market forces as well as the individual
consciences of its corporate managers.
B. What is “good” Corporate Behavior?
As a conscience involves determining right from wrong, some
definition of what is right, or, if we synonymously use the term “good,”
what is good corporate behavior is in order. After all, one person’s saint
is another person’s sinner.145 Take, for example, imaginary ABC
Corporation, which makes a decision to recognize same sex marriages
under its benefits plan. While the decision could certainly be justified as
a recruiting tool, many might decry the decision as immoral or wrong
while others would celebrate it as progressive and good. Further,
questions about the nature of “good” behavior are raised by activities
that appear to be altruistic in that they do not benefit the corporation. As
the CSR debate demonstrates, whether corporations should even be
delving into areas other than activities that profit the corporation is
debated. Given that a corporation does not have the ability to tell “right”
from “wrong,” and as the individuals who run the company and own
the company, i.e., management and shareholders, may have pluralistic
moral senses giving varying answers to what is “right” and “wrong,”
how can a corporation comport its behavior accordingly?
If we rely on such concepts as defining a conscience, there is no way
to reconcile a conscience and the corporation. However, if we look at the
end result of pressures to produce “good” behavior, we can see a theme
of behavior that benefits some entity, person, or group other than just the
corporation. Thus, corporations may not know right from wrong, but
corporations do act upon pressures to help or benefit some aspect of
society, be it global, national, statewide, municipality, or even a smaller
demographic or group. So, again, if we turn to the view that a
corporation is a social entity, based on its status as such, it can and does
145
Friedman, supra note 111, at 40 (noting, with regard to arguments for corporate
managers to act socially responsibly, that “one man’s good is another’s evil”).
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comport its behavior to act, perhaps not based on what is right or wrong,
but upon pressures to act to benefit some aspect of society other than
itself (though not mutually exclusive of benefiting itself). This returns us
to the conclusion that corporations act, not based upon an internal
conscience, but based upon an external conscience made up of many
interacting factors.
IV. A CATEGORICAL APPROACH TO WHAT DRIVES THE CORPORATE
CONSCIENCE
To briefly review, we have traced the evolution of the corporation in
the late eighteenth century from a relative few, specially chartered
associations generally organized to complete projects for the public
good, to the modern profit making behemoths of modern America.
Along the way, corporations have been subjected to regulation, often in
response to public outcry against perceived abuses of power. This
corporate evolution has also resulted in a general separation of
ownership and control, though that is not to say that corporate mangers
act completely free from external pressures such as to make a profit.
With regard to the corporate “conscience,” while corporations do not
have one in the traditional sense of the word, the corporation is run by
corporate managers who can act based upon their own sense of morals,
but that alone does not account for corporate behavior that benefits
society as a whole. But corporations do tend to act based upon the
decisions of management as they interact with other factors. I have
broken these factors into three main categories: (1) acts that benefit
society which are due to legal compliance; (2) acts that benefit society
which also benefit the corporation; and (3) acts that benefit society based
on altruistic (or semi-altruistic for those that do not believe in pure
altruism) motives.146 I will discuss each in turn below.
A. Compliance with the Law
The first category involves actions that have a positive effect on
society that are compelled by law.
Historically, we have seen
corporations grow from a relative few with special charters that were
Professor Cynthia Williams uses a similar categorical approach to explain why
corporations engage in social responsibility initiatives. Williams, supra note 141, at 1644.
Professor Williams divides her explanation into four possible reasons: 1) law compliance; 2)
market driven; 3) politically motivated; and, 4) intrinsic motivations. Id. at 1644-46.
Though my second category could easily be broken down into market-driven and
politically motivated to similarly mirror Professor Williams’ approach, for the purpose of
identifying what motivates the corporate conscience, I believe these are actually part of the
larger category of actions beneficial to the corporation as well as society.

146
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monitored by the state, to the numerous generally chartered
organizations of today. Along the way, corporate abuses, or at least
perceived abuses of power, have led to reactions by the government in
the form of laws meant to curb corporate behavior.147 Modern
corporations are faced with a number of laws and regulations affecting
their behavior, from environmental laws to securities regulations to
employment laws. While this may not seem to involve a decision of the
conscience, in fact, compliance with the law is very much a choice. If we
accept that the law is generally a society-imposed form of morality–of
what is right and wrong–then compliance represents a choice of the
conscience.148 Though we like to think of individuals as acting in
compliance with the law out of a sense of morality, punishment and
deterrence certainly play a part, and, just as individuals break the law for
a variety of reasons, so do corporations.
One reason corporations break the law is simple: profit.149 The lure
of profits may cause a corporation to engage in a cost-benefit analysis,
weighing what is a small fine for what may seem like rather innocuous
behavior against maximizing profits.150 And to a degree, it might be said
that if society imposes too small a fine, the prohibited behavior is not
generally deemed that bad in the first place.151 In addition to the level of
punishment, the risk of getting caught plays a factor in a corporation’s
willingness to violate the law. As Daniel Ostas notes, some regulations
“are not effectively enforced either because violators find it possible to

See supra part II.B.1.
Engel, supra note 132, at 37 (“If the legislature has purported to attach civil or criminal
liability to (or to retain such liability for) a particular piece of behavior, then there is, under
our assumptions, a public consensus that such behavior should be reduced.”); Daniel T.
Ostas, Cooperate, Comply, or Evade? A Corporate Executive’s Social Responsibilities With Regard
to Law, 41 AM. BUS. L.J. 559, 565 (2004) (citations omitted) (noting that under a “Public
Interest Theory” of regulation, “[r]egulators regulate in the public interest and regulations
reflect the aspirations of a democratic society.”).
149
ESTES, supra note 5, at 104 (quoting former SEC chief of enforcement Stanley Sporkin
that, “[i]n many instances where people are not lining their own pockets you can only
explain corporate crime in terms of ‘produce or perish.’”).
150
Ostas, supra note 148, at 573-74.
151
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80
MICH. L. REV. 1155, 1177, n.57 (1982) (“[M]anagers do not have an ethical duty to obey
economic regulatory laws just because the laws exist. They must determine the importance
of these laws. The penalties Congress names for disobedience are a measure of how much
it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules . . . managers not only may but
also should violate the rules when it is profitable to do so.”). But see Cynthia A. Williams,
Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1266-70 (19971998) (criticizing an “efficient breach” approach to regulatory law).
147
148

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/3

Marks: Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate "

2008]

Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation

1153

conceal their acts or because society provides insufficient resources to
prosecute violations.”152
An example of such conduct can be seen in the employment of illegal
immigrants. Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
fines may be imposed under Title 18 of the United States Code for
employers knowingly employing at least ten illegal immigrants;
employers in violation of the Code may also be imprisoned for up to five
years.153 Despite these penalties being in place since 1986, enforcement
has been steadily declining since then.154 As one commentator has
pointed out, “[i]n the ten-year period from 1992 to 2002, the number of
investigations of employers of illegal aliens declined seventy percent,
from 7053 to 2061, on-site job arrests of illegal aliens declined from 8027
to 451, and the fines imposed on employers declined from 1063 to
thirteen–a staggering ninety-nine percent decrease.”155 With such scarce
enforcement, it is easy to see how a corporation could choose to employ
illegal immigrants at lower wages and to take the seemingly low risk of
getting caught rather than decreasing its bottom line by having to pay
higher wages to legal workers.156
But even when the societal stakes should be high, corporations can
fail to meet legal standards based on a concern for profits. For instance,
in the wake of a March 2005 explosion in a BP refinery in Texas City,
Texas, BP conducted a self-audit of its process safety culture at all of its
U.S. refineries.157 While the study was not intended to measure legal
152
Ostas, supra note 148, at 567. David Engel breaks corporate non-compliance with
regulatory laws down into three reasons:
(1) the corporate acts may not be detected; (2) the transaction costs of
establishing liability may exceed the amount nominally due successful
private plaintiffs or the potential benefit perceived by the public
prosecutor; or (3) the nominal liability may bankrupt the corporation,
in which case the rule of limited liability will protect the shareholders.
Engel, supra note 132, at 39.
153
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(3)(A) (2000).
154
Hugh Alexander Fuller, Immigration,Compensation and Preemption: The Proper Measure
of Lost Future Earning Capacity Damages After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,
58 BAYLOR L. REV. 985, 1003 (2006) (citing Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Who Left the
Door Open?, TIME, Sept. 20, 2004, at 51, 52); Bob Herbert, Who’s Getting the New Jobs, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2004, at A23; Louis Uchitelle, I.N.S. Is Looking the Other Way As Illegal
Immigrants Fill Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2000, at C1.
155
See Fuller, supra note 154, at 1003.
156
See id. (noting that “penalties will not deter illegal immigration if they are never
imposed.”).
157
THE REPORT OF THE BP REFINERIES SAFETY REVIEW PANEL 17 (January 2007) (on file
with author). [In the interest of full academic disclosure, the author, in his previous
employment, briefly worked on portions of the independent safety review that was the

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4 [2008], Art. 3

1154 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

compliance or to assess the causes of the Texas City explosion,158 the
results of some of the surveys of employees give interesting insights into
the perception of where BP’s primary concerns were with regard to
safety processes, which can certainly implicate legal requirements. For
instance, in response to a question regarding whether process safety was
compromised by short-term financial goals, thirty percent of the Texas
City refinery operators and forty-five percent of a Toledo, Ohio refinery’s
operators said it was compromised.159 Similarly, thirty-three percent of
Texas City operators and forty-two percent of Toledo operators agreed
that process safety was secondary to achieving production goals.160
While these numbers are by no means a majority of the employees, it
represents a significant portion of people with an inside view “from the
trenches” so to speak,161 and demonstrates how the financial bottom line
could affect a corporation’s cultural attitude toward compliance.
The above discussion has focused on decisions to comply or not
comply with the law. However, corporations can also flirt with noncompliance by acting in the gray areas of the law. “Loopholes” in the
law may allow corporations to comply with the letter, if not the spirit, of
a law, or vague language in a law may leave a regulation open to a
variety of interpretations which a corporation might abuse.162 This has
led to what some have termed “[c]reative compliance” with the law, i.e.,
the ability to legally achieve the same ends as criminal action by
manipulating and exploiting the legal system.163 This area presents an
interesting cross-road for the corporate conscience, as it does not deal
basis of this report, but took no part in the formulation, dissemination, or review of the
survey questions cited.]
158
Id. at 14.
159
Id. at 64.
160
Id. at 65. Similar numbers were also reported for maintenance/craft technicians. Id. at
64-65. The surveys covered three other refineries in Whiting, Indiana, Cherry Point,
Oregon, and Carson, California. Id. The results for these refineries were much more
favorable to BP’s commitment to process safety. Id. However, contractors tended to have a
much less favorable view of BP’s commitment to process safety, with 39-60 percent
agreeing that production goals took precedence over process safety. Id.
161
Management uniformly answered the question more favorably to BP’s commitment to
process safety. Id. However, the report’s ultimate conclusion was that “BP has not
adequately established process safety as a core value across its five U.S. refineries.” Id. at
65.
162
Ostas, supra note 148, at 567. Ostas notes a fundamental difference between
compliance with the law and cooperation with the law, stating that “compliance embodies
a less expansive duty than does cooperation. At its heart, the distinction highlights the
difference between the letter and the spirit of the law. One complies with the letter of the
law; one cooperates with the law’s spirit.” Id. at 566.
163
Doreen McBarnet, After Enron Will “Whiter Than White Collar Crime” Still Wash?, 46
BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1091, 1092 (2006).
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with out-and-out illegality, but rather with a decision to not only comply
with the letter of the law but to also cooperate with the spirit of the
law.164
The accounting scandal that precipitated Enron’s collapse provides
an excellent example of “creative compliance.” One of the keys to
Enron’s ability to state such high profits was its use of mark-to-market
accounting. Under normal accounting methods, revenue recognition
occurs after a service has been provided (or mostly provided) and
payment has been received.165 Under the mark-to-market accounting
method, however, Enron was able to recognize revenue even before a
service was provided, allowing Enron “to report expected benefits from
future transactions into current period income.”166 Enron coupled the
mark-to-market accounting with an aggressive interpretation of what
constituted trades, adopting a “merchant model” of revenues.167 Under
the “merchant model,” an entity, such as a retailer, could account for the
entire selling price of products in their possession because they are
deemed to take the risk of selling the goods in their possession.168 Enron
used this model to account for the entire selling price of its energy
trades, rather than just accounting for the trading or brokerage fees as
was customary.169 Despite the potential for abuse in such accounting
practices, Enron had actually obtained approval from the SEC to use the
mark-to-market accounting method in January of 1992.170 The result,
however, was that Enron reported “enormously inflated performance,
high share values, otherwise unsustainable credit ratings and huge
recompense for executives in both performance related pay and share
options.”171

Ostas, supra note 148, at 566. Another interesting twist on this concept involves the
corporation’s ability to influence the law. Fisch, supra note 136, at 1604-05. Through
political influence, corporations have the ability to change laws with which they do not
want to comply. Id. at 1610.
165
Bala G. Dharan & William R. Bufkins, Red Flags in Enron’s Reporting of Revenues and
Key Financial Measures, in ENRON: CORPORATE FIASCOS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 102 (Nancy
B. Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
166
Id. at 101-02.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 103.
169
Id. The accounting for just the brokerage fee of the trade is known as the “agent
model” because an “‘agent’ is someone who provides a service to the customer (such as
facilitating the purchase of an airline ticket), but does not really take up the risks of
possession and the risks of collection.” Id.
170
Id. at 104.
171
McBarnet, supra note 163, at 1095; Dharan & Bufkins, supra note 165, at 103 (estimating
that revenues were increased as much as fifty times through use of these accounting
164
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As can be seen from the examples above, the mere fact that actions
are compelled by the law does not mean that they are devoid of a choice.
Profit weighs a clear role in the decisions of some corporations to engage
in, or refrain from, illegal activities. Though some may argue that a costbenefit analysis is appropriate with regard to legal compliance, it would
be difficult to fault a corporation for choosing compliance. Even Milton
Friedman has caveated that the responsibility of businessmen to make as
much money as possible is to be done “while conforming to the basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in
ethical custom.”172 And even when a corporation is practicing “creative
compliance,” as in the Enron example above, the spirit of the law may be
broken by doing what is not arguably illegal, but still in violation of the
underlying rules of society embodied in ethical custom.
B. Acts that Benefit both Society and the Corporation
This category includes behavior that has a positive effect on society
but that also benefits the corporation. At the most basic level, most
charitable donations tend to fall in this category.173 Corporations are
eligible for a tax deduction on the donations, reaping the benefits of
good public relations with a relatively small output of money when
compared to the company’s net profits. However, though a large
donation of the corporation’s profits would likely not be worth the tax
deduction or the benefits from positive public relations, few corporations
give more than a very small percentage of their profits to charity,174
despite the Federal Tax Code allowing for a deduction for up to ten
percent.175
Some corporate giving also contains an ulterior motive beyond the
obvious benefits to the corporation and goodwill obtained. Again, Enron
provides a good example of the motives behind charitable donations.
methods). Of course, Enron involved much more than mere creative compliance to
maximize shareholder profits, as there was also a large degree of self-dealing.
172
Friedman, supra note 111, at 37.
173
Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational Motivations for Corporate
Giving: Complementing Economic Theory with Organization Science, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
1035, 1039 (1997) (noting that “economists tend to believe that nearly all donations benefit
the corporation in some way.”) (citation omitted).
174
SPECIAL REPORT: PHILANTHROPY 2005, Smarter Corporate Giving, BUSINESS WEEK,
November 28, 2005, at 72 (noting that giving in 2004 by corporations equaled 1.2 percent of
total corporate profits, which was the average for the previous forty years). Corporate
giving in the United States in 2006 reportedly only accounted for 4.3 percent of the total
contributions made to charities in 2006, while 75.6 percent came from individuals. Report:
Most U.S. giving done by individuals, CINCINNATI BUS. COUR., June 25, 2007.
175
I.R.C. § 170(b)(2) (2006).

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/3

Marks: Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate "

2008]

Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation

1157

Despite its other questionable dealings, Enron was known for its charity,
annually disbursing one percent of its pretax earnings to worthy causes,
which totaled $12 million in 2001.176 Enron’s giving was so extensive
that, after its fall, many of the beneficiaries of its generosity, including
the United Way, YMCA, and local Houston arts and theater programs,
felt its absence.177 While Enron’s charity benefited the community, there
was also a benefit to Enron; the most obvious benefit being the goodwill
and positive public relations Enron enjoyed as a good “corporate
citizen.” Also, as noted above, such donations would provide a tax
deduction, but there may have also been a more sinister motive behind
Enron’s largesse. Following Enron’s fall, many questioned whether
Enron was giving money, both to charitable organizations as well as
political contributions, to avoid closer scrutiny of its operations.178
Viewed cynically, Enron’s generosity was intended to influence people
with the power to help or hurt the company.179 As accounting professor
Ralph Estes surmised, “[m]ost of the rationale is that somehow it will
pay off on the bottom line . . . It’s calculated to pay a dividend, and these
actions can keep the wolves from the door.”180 In other words, the
benefit gained by charitable activities, whether it be through a reduction
in the costs of defending the corporation’s actions before the
government, an avoidance of governmental regulations, or a reduction in
property damage at the hands of activists, makes-up for or exceeds the
costs to the corporation.181

176
Allan Turner, Enron’s Fall Shakes Up Nonprofit Community, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 7, 2001,
at A1.
177
Id. (collecting accounts of Enron’s corporate giving as well as the efforts of its
individual employees).
178
Alan Clendenning, Critics Question Enron’s Charitable Donations: Company and Lay
Contributed to Wide Range of Causes, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 27, 2002, at A4.
179
Id.
180
Id. (quoting Dr. Ralph Estes, accounting professor emeritus at American University).
181
NEIL H. JACOBY, CORPORATE POWER AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE
FUTURE 194-97 (1973).
Rational enterprise managers judge the yield of outlays for social
purposes by their long-run effect upon profits. They measure the
return on the “investment” in each social program. Each social outlay
is tested by a cost/benefit analysis. Among the benefits may be a
reduction in the costs of defending the firm’s actions before the
legislative or executive agencies of government, an avoidance of
onerous governmental regulations, or a reduction in property damage
at the hands of activists. Social pressures generate costs, the amount of
which can be minimized by appropriate corporate outlays.
Id. at 196.
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Other than charitable donations, corporations have developed a
number of other ways to help society while adding to the company’s
bottom line and/or reputation. For instance, one modern trend is the
integration of marketing campaigns for products with prominent
charities or social causes.182 A small sampling of such ventures was
recounted in November of 2006 in The New York Times:
Saks Fifth Avenue is selling a leather jacket from
Kenneth Cole this holiday season for $795, and a
percentage of the sales price will be donated to Help
USA, a group that fights homelessness.
Bath & Body Works is selling an Elton John scented
candle for $16.50, with 10 percent of each sale, or $2,
going to the Elton John AIDS Foundation.
Gap, Apple Computer and Motorola are offering
limited-edition red-colored products to benefit the AIDS
charity (Product) RED. Gap gives 50 percent of the
profits from sales; Apple gives $10 for each iPod Nano;
and Motorola $17 for each phone.183
The RED campaign is an excellent example of this trend and of
corporate behavior that has a positive effect on society while benefiting
the corporation. The Red campaign is the brain child of musician Bono
and California politician Bobby Shriver.184 The concept is simple:
manufacturers make product lines tied to the Red campaign, for instance
a red Motokrzr phone, and give a portion of the profits to the Global

Craig and Marc Kielburger, Cause-tied Marketing Not Perfect, TORONTO STAR, July 16,
2007, at World and Comment (noting that cause-related marketing is an “increasingly
effective way to reach savvy consumers.”); John Hall Scripps, Firm, Non-profits Both Benefit
From Cause Marketing, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, July 13, 2007, at 3E; Michael Barbaro,
Candles, Jeans, Lipsticks: Products With Ulterior Motives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2006, at F33
(“[R]etailers across the country are putting philanthropy at the center of their product lines,
whether it is clothes, books or shoes.”). Michael E. Porter and Mark R. Kramer have
described corporations’ attempts at creating value for both society and themselves as a
“shared value[,]” stating: “The essential test that should guide [corporate social
responsibility] is not whether a cause is worthy but whether it presents an opportunity to
create shared value—that is, a meaningful benefit for society that is also valuable to the
business.” Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Link Between Competitive Advantage and
Corporate Social Resposnibility, HARV. BUS. REV., HBR Spotlight, Dec. 2006, at 8.
183
Barbaro, supra note 182, at F33.
184
Louise Story, Want to Help Treat AIDS in Africa? Buy a Cellphone, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4,
2006, at C8.
182
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Fund to Fight AIDS.185 The idea is that, rather than a one-time charitable
donation, because the companies are making a profit from the sale of the
RED products, the donations will be sustained.186 Participants include
Gap, Armani Exchange, Motorola, Converse, Apple, and American
Express.187 There have, however, been some concerns raised over the
transparency of the donations in the RED campaign,188 and while the
concept seems sound, time will tell whether abuses destroy the public
benefit to such campaigns.
The move by many corporations to go “green” (adopt
environmentally friendly practices) often offers another example of
actions that benefit society and the corporation. Corporations that offer
“green” products or services hope to cash-in on an environmentally
conscious consumer base.189 Additionally, as with the RED campaign,
corporations get the public relations benefit of claiming they are helping
the environment.190 But, the “green” movement goes beyond appealing
to the consumer’s desire to help the environment. Many corporations see
a benefit in energy savings themselves.191 For instance, a standard
feature in new Wal-Marts is to have a series of skylights in the roof to
reduce energy costs for lighting.192 Such “green” construction is seen as
a way many companies can reduce the environmental impacts of

Id.
Id.
187
Id.; Barbaro, supra note 182, at F33.
188
Scripps, supra note 182, at 3E (noting concerns over transparency in accounting and
how the proceeds of products are funneled to the Global Fund). Cf. Kielburger, supra note
182, at 2 (noting that the campaign has spent over four times as much in advertising than it
has raised).
189
Paul Davidson, Getting Gold Out of Green: Companies Learn Eco-friendliness Helps Bottom
Line, USA TODAY, April 19, 2007, at 7A.
190
This has led to some concerns that corporations are “‘greenwashing,’ or using
environmentalism to polish their corporate images.” Id. Consumers concerned over the
climate-friendliness of companies can obtain a global scorecard which ranks companies
based, among other things, on “what they have done to reduce their impact on the climate,
[and] their stances on global-warming legislation.” MSNBC News Services, Companies Get
Ranked on Global Warming: Canon, Nike Among the Best; Apple, eBay, Levi Strauss Among
Worst, June 19, 2007, available at https://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19315109/ (describing it
as a “pocket-sized scorecard produced by a new nonprofit, Climate Counts, and based on
22 criteria developed with help from experts.”).
191
Id.; Daniel Franklin, A change in climate; The greening of corporate responsibility, in Just
good business: A special report on corporate social responsibility, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008,
at 14 (“Beyond the lofty talk, reducing a company’s output of greenhouse gasses and
encouraging ‘responsible’ use of resources can also mean cutting waste and saving
money.”); Jim Downing, Go Green to Save Some Green; Wal-Mart Seeks Ways to Cut Electricity
Usage, FORT WAYNE J. GAZETTE, April 30, 2007, at 4C.
192
Downing, supra note 191, at 4C.
185
186
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operations.193 Other companies are reducing their impact and saving
money through other means, such as Marriott Hotel’s use of compact
fluorescent light bulbs to save 65% on hotel lighting costs.194 Beyond the
benefits to the corporation in energy savings and to public relations,
some states have also created incentives for environmentally friendly
corporations.195 For instance, Wisconsin has enacted “Green Tier”
legislation, which is designed to promote “superior environmental
performance” by businesses.196 The Wisconsin legislation creates a twotier market-based incentive program for environmentally responsible
businesses.197 Also, on the federal level, the U.S. has given tax credits in
the past to renewable-energy producers, though the failure to renew the
credit in some years has made the credit unpredictable.198 Still, there is a
general consensus among many that a federal level of control is
inevitable, be it through incentives or strict controls.199 Even such federal
controls have the potential to create big business, however, in the form of
carbon credits, i.e., credits that can be bought on the open market that are
awarded to businesses for the tons of carbon dioxide that are not
emitted.200 Such legislation would provide another potential money
making angle for corporations that choose to go “green.”201

Brian D. Anderson, Legal and Business Issues of Green Building, 79 WIS. LAW. 10, 11
(2006); Rick Rothacker, Environmentally Friendly Projects: Buildings growing Wachovia, BofA
part of push to cut the ecological impact of doing business, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER, May 2, 2007, at
1D.
194
Davidson, supra note 189, at 7A.
195
See, e.g., WIS. STAT. § 299.83 (2007) (setting out Green Tier legislation intended to create
incentives for businesses with superior environmental performance). Similarly, Oregon
has established a Green Permits program which offers reduced inspection frequency,
among other benefits, as an incentive to encourage firms to adopt an environmental
management system. OR. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, THE OREGON GREEN PERMITS PROGRAM
GUIDE 4-1 (2000).
196
WIS. STAT. § 299.83; Linda H. Bochert & Mary Woolsey Schlaefer, Achieving
Environmental Excellence: Green Tier Legislation, 78 WIS. LAW. 8, 9 (2005).
197
Bochert & Schlafer, supra note 196, at 9.
198
Sunlit Uplands: Wind and Solar Power are Flourishing,Tthanks to Subsidies, THE
ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, in Cleaning up: A Special Report on Business and Climate Change, at
16-19.
199
Everybody’s Green Now: How America’s Big Companies Got Environmentalism, THE
ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, in Cleaning up: A Special Report on Business and Climate Change, at
6.
200
Trading Thin Air: The Carbon Market is Working, but not Bringing Forth as Much
Innovation as had Been Hoped, THE ECONOMIST, June 2, 2007, in Cleaning up: A Special Report
on Business and Climate Change, at 8.
201
Of course, any compulsory legislation would belong in the first category. I have
included “green” legislation in the second category only to the degree that it is incentive
based as opposed to compulsory.
193
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In all of the situations described above, however, the question must
be asked: if there is a benefit to the corporation, why is this even a
choice? After all, it would seem that if choosing to pair with the RED
campaign or to switch all of your business’s light bulbs over to compact
fluorescent light bulbs will save or make your business money, then why
isn’t everyone doing this? What sort of choice is being made? Again,
turning a profit, even if just in the short-term, can be an obstacle. Many
corporate managers feel pressure to make short-term earnings.
According to a survey conducted by authors Dominic Dodd and Ken
Favaro for their book, The Three Tensions, “nearly two-thirds (63 percent)
of the managers in our survey said that the capital markets are biased
toward short-term earnings.”202 Thus, if a venture requires a large upfront outlay of capital, such as some energy-saving steps, or if the return
is speculative, it is understandable how some corporate managers might
delay or decline to enter into such ventures.203
C. Altruistic (or Semi-Altruistic) Acts
The third and final category involves corporate behavior that
benefits society and is initiated by altruistic motives. Of course, the very
term “altruistic” can be controversial. The term “altruism” means an
“unselfish concern for the welfare of others.”204 However, it could be
argued that no action, be it by a corporation or an individual, is
completely unselfish.205 However, it is not the purpose of this Article to
enter into such a philosophical debate, and so, for the purposes of this
Article, I will use the term more loosely to cover behavior that is
motivated by something other than a solid and foreseeable benefit to the
corporation.
Even given this broad definition, it can be hard to categorize
corporate behavior as “altruistic.” As has already been noted, corporate
managers are influenced and pressured to maximize profit. Some
privately held corporations, however, have made altruistic behavior a
part of their corporate culture. This is often initiated by specific persons
DOMINIC DODD & KEN FAVARO, THE THREE TENSIONS 71 (2007).
Id. at 72 (noting that, of those surveyed, 27 percent often, and 54 percent sometimes,
cut spending on R&D, marketing, or IT to safeguard short-term earnings and 13 percent
often, and 64 percent sometimes, delayed a project, even if it would be profitable for the
same reason).
204
WEBSTER’S UNIVERSAL COLLEGE DICTIONARY (1997).
205
Indeed, a recent study suggests that undertaking unselfish acts releases chemicals in
the brain that activate some of the same pleasure centers in your brain as food and sex. To
your brain, altruism’s as good as sex: Even paying taxes can trigger pleasure centers, study says,
REUTERS, June 14, 2007, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19235071/.
202
203
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within the organizations that have taken stands based on their own
beliefs as to how a corporation should behave. These specific persons, in
effect, act as individual “Jiminy Crickets” for the corporation. For
instance, an example many a hungry fast-food fan is aware of is that
Chik-fil-A is not open on Sundays.206 The reason: Chik-fil-A’s founder
and chairman, S. Truett Cathy, is a devout Christian.207 His beliefs have
led him never to have his businesses open on Sundays, “a time in the
quick service industry that normally generates 20 percent of revenue.”208
While the company also admits that it is a useful incentive in hiring and
retaining employees,209 it is clear that the real motivation is S. Truett
Cathy’s desire to worship and glorify his God. As Mr. Cathy expressed
in response to a question about what he would like his greatest legacy to
the organization to be:
I think the greatest contribution would be the fact that
we’re closed on Sunday. We’ve done that for 60 years.
And there are times when you mention Chick-fil-A,
yeah, that’s the place that’s closed on Sundays. And it
gives us opportunity to explain well sure, you can’t go
eat at Chick-fil-A because they’re closed on Sunday to
respect the Lord’s Day. ‘Honor the Lord’s Day and keep
it holy.’ It’s a special day that the Lord has given Man.
We need that day off, it’s to honor God. We just need a
day off to think about the little things that are important.
And that’s the bottom line.210

206
See Chik-fil-A, corporate website, http://www.chik-fil-a.com/Closed.asp (last visited
March 23, 2008).
207
Miles Davis & Leyland M. Lucas, Principle before Profits: An Interview with S. Truett
Cathy, NEW ENGLAND J. OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, April 1, 2007, at 27; Thuy-Doan Le, A Day of
Rest: Religious Choice May Sacrifice Sales but Build Customer Loyalty, THE SACRAMENTO BEE,
April 15, 2006, at D1.
208
Davis & Leyland, supra note 207, at 27; Ben Werner, Chik-fil-A Founder Shares his
Philosophy, THE COLUMBIA (SC) STATE, April 18, 2007.
209
Le, supra note 207.
210
Davis & Leyland, supra note 207, at 31. Interestingly, when asked about corporate
social responsibility and whether the responsibility of a corporate manager is to the
stockholders or shareholders, Mr. Cathy responded:
You should be honest to your stockholders. Look at it the way they
practice in the Navy where the captain’s always the last one to depart
from the ship. If you got a sinking ship, it is the captain who leaves
last. I felt that in business it’s the same way, you got to be responsible
to the stockholders–unlike a business owner I heard about. He took
his money and left the company in bad shape. He shouldn’t have
walked off, leaving his business in trouble. He did all he could to
leave the scene. You should take care of the stockholders, those who
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Thus, though there may be some incidental benefits to the decision
to close on Sundays, the real motivation behind the decision is not a
profit or benefit seeking motive, but rather a religiously based decision.
Ben & Jerry’s ice cream offers another example of a corporation that
has engaged in behavior for reasons other than profit.211 Ben & Jerry’s
was started by Ben Cohen and Jerry Greenfield in Burlington, Vermont,
in 1978.212 From its inception, Ben & Jerry’s used milk from local dairy
farmers that was grown hormone-free and partnered early-on with nonprofit organizations to offer job training to disadvantaged people.213 In
addition, Ben & Jerry’s set up a compensation plan through which all
staff earned at least twenty percent of the salary of the highest paid
employee and committed 7.5 percent of its pre-tax profits to
philanthropic causes.214 Even though Ben & Jerry’s was bought by food
giant Unilever in 2000, the deal included a promise by Unilever to keep
in place Ben & Jerry’s corporate philanthropic philosophy as well as to
commit a percentage of profits to charity.215 And since the takeover, Ben
& Jerry’s still boasts that the company’s annual reports continue to
“evaluate achievement on social and environmental goals, including
assessments by an external auditor.”216
That is not to say that only privately held corporations can fall into
this category. For instance, Robert Galvin, a former senior officer with
Motorola, described an instance where his company forfeited profits

invest their life savings in it and trust in the company. They shouldn’t
be disappointed by the person they’re trusting in, with mistake and no
protection really, but that’s the stock market. But it gets back to
biblical principles. Treat others like you like to be treated, be honest
and be truthful. These are the basic things that are expected of an
individual.
Id. at 30.
211
EMILY ROSS & ANGUS HOLLAND, 100 GREAT BUSINESSES AND THE MINDS BEHIND THEM
353 (Sourcebooks, Inc. 2006) (2004) (noting that Ben & Jerry’s is the first company to make a
profit while acting like a non-profit organization).
212
Id.
213
Id. at 353-55.
214
Id. at 355. Ben & Jerry’s also “set up all manner of revenue streams into nonprofit
activities . . . [and] offered staff extended maternity and paternity leave and allowances for
de facto and gay couples.” Id.
215
Id. at 355-56. According to Ben & Jerry’s website, it donates “over $1.1 million” a year
to charity and donated $1.6 million in 2006. See http://www.benjerry.com/foundation/
(last visited March 23, 2008); see also Company Profile for Ben & Jerry’s, March 30, 2007,
available at http://www.benjerry.com/our_company/press_center/press/.
216
50 for History, HR MAGAZINE, Dec. 1, 2005, at 10.
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based upon principles of integrity and respect for other people.217 His
anecdote recalls an instance around 1950 when Motorola had the
opportunity to enter into a microwave contract with a South American
government.218 The contract would have meant a significant, but not
enormous, increase in the company’s profit margin.219 However, it came
to the company’s attention that the South American government was
trying to play footloose with where the money was going, and it was
suspected that the contract would ultimately result in cash being
funneled to some of that country’s generals.220 Motorola refused to enter
into the contract and, furthermore, according to Galvin, would never
solicit that government again, despite the profit that could be made.221
But, does this anecdote really represent an instance of altruistic
behavior? Galvin admits that, though the company did not take that
contract, it “made so much more money honorably over the next twenty
years while [the] anecdote was still fresh in people’s minds,”222
indicating that the reputation boost and subsequent positive effect it had
on the company’s bottom line was worth any short-term profit they
could have made by entering into a contract with a corrupt government.
So does this sort of conduct really belong in the previous category?
Perhaps not; according to Galvin, Motorola’s decision, or perhaps more
accurately, the decision of its officers, was not based on what was
profitable or legal but on what the company held as a core value of right
and wrong.223
Another company that has recently made headlines with its
seemingly progressive corporate culture is American Apparel, Inc. which
specializes in selling T-shirts.224 American Apparel’s claim to fame is
that all of its merchandise is manufactured in Los Angeles, California,

Robert W. Galvin, Corporate Social Responsibility is Not a Challenge, in IS THE GOOD
CORPORATION DEAD? SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 254 (John W. Houck &
Oliver F. Williams eds., 1996).
218
Id.
219
Id. at 255.
220
Id. at 254-55. This occurred prior to enactment of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act
(“FCPA”). Id. at 258; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2006).
221
Galvin, supra note 217, at 255.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 258. Galvin notes that although the conduct in question in the anecdote would
now be illegal, he believes that the legality was irrelevant because, as he puts it, “I know
right from wrong and practice what is right, regardless of the law.” Id.
224
American Apparel, http://americanapparel.net/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2008) (American
Apparel, Inc. trades on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) as APP).
217

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol42/iss4/3

Marks: Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation: Understanding the Corporate "

2008]

Jiminy Cricket for the Corporation

1165

rather than overseas.225 American Apparel’s founder, Dov Charney, has
made it his company’s goal to prove that T-shirts can be made profitably
in the U.S.A. while still paying a decent wage and maintaining good
working conditions.226 Indeed, American Apparel has not just settled for
manufacturing in the U.S., but also has offered benefits beyond a
“decent” wage. Along with workers averaging $12.50 an hour,227
American Apparel offers a number of perks such as health insurance,
paid vacations, free English classes (the workers are predominantly
Hispanic), subsidized bus passes, lunches, legal assistance as well as
yoga, massage, and counseling.228 American Apparel has planned to
begin a stock plan under which the average employee would receive 540
shares in the company.229 This is all part of Charney’s vision to present a
“sweatshop free” product which has reaped rewards for the company.230
American Apparel reported $80 million in sales in 2003231 and that
number grew to $300 million in 2006.232
The sweatshop-free vision is more than just an altruistic tag-line,
however; it is also the heart of American Apparel’s business model. By
keeping manufacturing in the U.S., Charney claims he is better able to
respond to market demands as well as ensure quality control.233 The
generous pay and benefits also helps attract workers. As Charney
himself has noted, “It’s not a marketing ploy, necessarily, it’s about
taking care of people that are taking care of the company. And it’s also a
capitalistic ploy, because they can say: ‘Well, you know, someone works
at another factory, they make $2 less or $5 less an hour,’ and they’re ‘Oh,

SUZANNE BERGER, HOW WE COMPETE: WHAT COMPANIES AROUND THE WORLD ARE
DOING TO MAKE IT IN TODAY’S GLOBAL ECONOMY 201-02 (2006); Rob Walker, Conscience
Undercover, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2004, at Section 6, p. 18; CBS Sunday Morning (CBS
television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by John Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator
of American Apparel company).
226
BERGER, supra note 225, at 203.
227
Id. at 202; Walker, supra note 225 (quoting a $13 per hour wage).
228
BERGER, supra note 225, at 202-03; Linda Baker, Made in the U.S. of A.?, SALON, Feb. 11,
2004.
229
CBS Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by John
Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator of American Apparel company).
230
BERGER, supra note 225, at 203. American Apparel Registers Record-Breaking Sales, BUS.
WIRE, Dec. 10, 2002.
231
Jenny Strasburg, Made in the U.S.A., SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., July 4, 2004, at Business
J1.
232
CBS Sunday Morning: To aT, (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by
John Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator of American Apparel company).
233
Id.; see also BERGER, supra note 225, at 203; Marisa Katz, Millionaire in a T-shirt, Israel
Business Arena, Nov. 16, 2004 (noting that Charney briefly outsourced in the beginning to
Mexico but that the quality control created issues that off-set the savings in cheaper labor).
225
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at American Apparel, you have medical insurance.’”234 The sweatshop
free tagline has also been a marketing point itself, which may be a large
part of the company’s success.235 Thus, as with the Motorola example
above, the corporate behavior may have its genesis in an altruistic or
semi-altruistic motive. Ultimately, it is the concept’s profitability that
makes it sustainable. As Charney himself has noted, “If you’ve got a
company where everybody wins, that company will be around for
awhile.”236
D. Blurring the Lines
As the Motorola anecdote and American Apparel business model
demonstrate, it is often difficult to identify the main motivating factor
behind corporate behavior that is beneficial to society. Though the
Federal Corrupt Practices Act was not yet in place, Motorola may have
felt it was treading into a gray legal area, or at least one that could
eventually cause it legal headaches. Additionally, as Galvin noted, the
corporation saw a long-term benefit based on refraining to do business.
American Apparel is motivated to provide a sweatshop free product, but
that same tagline has helped sell the shirts and thus made the product
profitable. Identifying what motivates such corporate behavior is
difficult without more information from the companies themselves,237
and even then, we may be suspect of their explanations, which may be
nothing more than a public relations spin. On the other hand, corporate
managers may be doing the opposite, attempting to offer legitimate
beneficial results for the corporation to justify their own desire to engage
in altruistic behavior.238
In reflecting upon the above factors, it is important to note that they
are just that, factors. They very well may not be mutually exclusive, but
234
CBS Sunday Morning (CBS television broadcast Feb. 4, 2007) (Interview by John
Blackstone with Dov Charney, creator of American Apparel company).
235
Id.; BERGER, supra note 225, at 202-03; Strasburg, supra note 231; Shannon McMahon,
Made in Downtown L.A.; American Apparel’s progressive practices winning over customers, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 18, 2004, at Business, C-1 (“American Apparel’s socially
conscious vibe is still what first strikes a chord with consumers.”).
236
McMahon, supra note 235 (quoting Dov Charney).
237
As Professor Williams notes in discussing her own categorical approach to CSR
initiatives, “[d]istinguishing between these explanations is difficult without access to
information about companies’ internal decision-making processes, which will require more
in-depth interviews and case studies; there are undoubtedly multiple explanations for this
relatively new phenomenon.” Williams, supra note 141, at 1647.
238
Abzug & Webb, supra note 173, at 1041 (noting that, with regard to giving, because
managers cannot separate their individual interests from occupational decision-making,
managers “may maximize their own utility”).
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rather, interact in a complex way to produce socially beneficial corporate
behaviors. And while examples have been used to try and identify
behaviors based upon driving factors, it is certainly open for debate
whether, and to what degree, a corporate behavior is based upon one of
the mentioned categories.
V. JUDGING THE CORPORATE CONSCIENCE
It is tempting, when looking at the above categories, to use them as a
checklist for good corporate behavior. For instance, if a corporation is
generally abiding by the laws and occasionally donating money to
charity, then it could be concluded that the corporation is acting as an
acceptable corporate citizen, even if it does not engage in altruistic acts.
Just as individual citizen John Doe, who generally abides by the law
(though we would probably tend to forgive the errant minor violation
such as a traffic ticket) and who occasionally gives money to a local
charity, but enjoys the tax write-off, could be deemed a good citizen.
However, I believe such an approach over-simplifies the analysis.
Continuing with the John Doe example, Doe, a single unattached man,
could also be having an affair with his best friend’s fiancé. Many would
consider this rather morally reprehensible, though completely legal.
Corporations can also engage in behavior that, though legal, can be seen
as immoral and affect our view of their corporate citizenship. Returning
to the example of the corporation that chooses to recognize same sex
partnerships, whether the corporation is considered to have made a right
or wrong choice is a highly individualized question.
This is not to say that the factors are useless in evaluating corporate
behavior. Quite the contrary, someone may well look at a situation and
make his or her own determination of what the motivating factor should
be behind socially beneficial actions. Law and economics proponents
may well argue that no corporate act should be based on the altruistic
category, while proponents of CSR will likely promote decision-making
based in that same category (though perhaps not exclusively). But
whatever the moral base of the individual judging corporate behavior,
understanding what motivates corporate behavior is important in
understanding how to change or curb corporate behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
The corporation has evolved extensively from its roots in America as
a specially chartered association organized to accomplish some public
good, to the modern profit-making entities of today. Along the way,
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abuses of corporate power, whether real or perceived, have resulted in
regulations aimed at curbing corporate behavior. Furthermore, the
separation of ownership from control in the corporation, articulated in
the Berle-Means thesis, has led to debates over the roles and duties of
corporate managers. This has helped to shape the debate over whether,
and to what degree, corporate managers should cause the corporation to
engage in socially beneficial behaviors.
Though these individuals who run the corporation have a conscience
(arguably as human beings), the corporation itself does not have one in
the traditional sense of the word. The corporation is an artificial entity,
soulless and devoid of the ability to reflect upon its actions. However,
like the wooden boy, Pinocchio, corporate behavior is directed by its
own Jiminy Cricket, i.e. external factors. These external factors of legal
compliance, corporate benefit and even altruism (even if it is manifested
through a controlling corporate manager), often act in conjunction to
produce corporate behaviors that ultimately benefit some aspect of
society. While more empirical research is needed to understand to what
degree each of these factors affects corporate behaviors, through
understanding these factors, we may begin to understand why
corporations act as they do and how corporate behaviors may be curbed
in the future.
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